big serge substack

Big serge substack

As the calendar barrels into another year and we tick away the days of February, notable anniversaries are marked off in sequence, big serge substack. The nature of the war changed dramatically after a big serge substack and mobile opening phase. With the collapse of the negotiation process whether thanks to Boris Johnson or notit became clear that the only way out of the conflict would be through the strategic defeat of one party by the other.

In the last 72 hours or so, the pro-Russian side of the internet has been sent into an tailspin of panic over a new Ukrainian counteroffensive which is currently being launched in the Kharkov region, with the intention of compromising the Russian army grouping at Izyum. The panic was triggered by claims that Ukraine was advancing unopposed, encircling - or perhaps even capturing - the city of Balakliya - and on the verge of cutting off supply lines to Izyum. A modest city with a prewar population of perhaps 50, people, Izyum was always slated to be a focal point in this war, due to its location at a critical intersection. The topography of northeastern Ukraine is dominated by a few critically important features which determine patterns of movement. The region is furthermore shaped by the Severodonetsk River - alternatively called simply the Donets from which the Donbas, or Donets Basin, draws its name - which snakes lazily around the plain. Izyum is a strategically crucial city because it is where the highway crosses the river; as an added cherry on top, the Oskil River - a major tributary of the Donets - confluences with the Donets less than five miles to the east of Izyum, meaning the city essentially sits directly on the intersection of all the most important geographic features of the region. A highly simplified map of the area looks like this:.

Big serge substack

It is probably safe to say that the current week June , is shaping up to be one of the most significant of the entire Russo-Ukrainian War. On Monday, all eyes were on the Ukrainian Armed Forces and their much anticipated summer counteroffensive, which began with a series of battallion level attacks across the breadth of the theater. Instead, the entire Ukrainian offensive was overshadowed by the sudden and entirely unexpected failure of the dam at Nova Kakhovka on the lower Dneiper. In any case, the legalities are not the main point here. The destruction of dams has the potential to impact civilians on a scale which is an order of magnitude higher than anything which has yet occured. Through May of this year, there were fewer than 9, recorded civilian deaths in Ukraine including both Ukrainian and Russian controlled territories. This is a thankfully low number, compared for example to the war in Syria, where over 30, civilians are killed annually , or Iraq, where nearly 18, civilians died per year in the years following the American invasion in A breaking dam, however, massively escalates the threat to civilians. Tens of thousands of civilians are in the flood path and have to be evacuated - but perhaps even more significantly, the destruction of the dam creates a major threat to agriculture. There are also rising escalation risks, and the last thing anybody wants is for dams to become a permanent menu item. In this article, I want to conduct a preliminary assessment of the destruction of the dam, its consequences, and its potential causes.

Military history writer Big Serge has published an excellent essay that explains much of what has puzzled observers of the conflict in Ukraine—why does Russia appear to be hanging back, what happened to that much touted offensive, and some other matters as well. As if to emphasize the point, big serge substack, RUSI notes that the Russian big serge substack of forces in Ukraine that is, only those forces deployed in theater at the moment rose fromtoover the last year.

Check this out me korosho drugies: bigserge. This guy is fucking hilarious. Kyive was a trap. Kharkiv was a trap. Lyman was a trap. Kherson is a trap. He never gives up!

Military history writer Big Serge has published an excellent essay that explains much of what has puzzled observers of the conflict in Ukraine—why does Russia appear to be hanging back, what happened to that much touted offensive, and some other matters as well. First, however, here are some basic points that will serve as guide posts. Russia, for political reasons, has not yet declared war on Ukraine—the conflict remains, legally, a Special Military Operation. Legality is very important to him, as we know from his criticisms of the Rules-Based Order, in which the rules are unilaterally made up on the go. A declaration of war may or may not happen, but the lack of such a declaration at this point places constraints on the Russian military. The Russian military is composed of a professional military—personnel who are on contract—and conscripts. Conscripts serve only for a limited time and are mostly trainees for most of their service.

Big serge substack

The Phalanx CIWS SEE-wiz is an automated gun-based close-in weapon system to defend military watercraft automatically against incoming threats such as aircraft, missiles, and small boats. This is essentially the ships last layer of defense against any incoming attacks. A smart commenter asks the right question, which leads to this exchange:.

Harley idle air control valve location

With the collapse of the negotiation process whether thanks to Boris Johnson or not , it became clear that the only way out of the conflict would be through the strategic defeat of one party by the other. Expand full comment. What if this all really turns out to be a strategic level ambush? But they got Big Serge, so call it a draw. The most important of these is the Crimean canal, which carries Dnieper water to Crimea, but there are also a series of irrigation works which are vital to agricutlure in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts. Kherson is a trap. Overall, the broad operational situation suggests that Russia is developing offensive momentum across the entire theater. In its aura, in its sphere of influence, one will become acquainted with pain in a way that far exceeds any imagination. That decision certainly looks prescient now, but thanks to this earlier discussion there was already a bevy of analysis conducted predicting what the flood path might look like. Expand full comment. Share this discussion. Again as in the case of Bakhmut and Lysychansk-Severodonetsk there was an expectation among some that Russia would attempt to encircle the city, but this still does not look feasible in the current operating environment under the nexus of fires and ISR. So, drones clearly offer a lethal and important battlefield expedient, but they are neither a genuine replacement for artillery nor an arm of clear advantage for Ukraine. First, we can try to gauge casualties.

The Russo-Ukrainian War has been a novel historical experience for a variety of reasons, and not only for the intricacies and technicalities of the military enterprise itself. This became the first conventional military conflict to occur in the age of social media and planetary cinematography that is, the ubiquitous presence of cameras. This brought a veneer though only a veneer of immanence to war, which for millennia had unveiled itself only through the mediating forces of cable news, print newspapers, and victory steles.

Notice how Russian victory continually retreats in time and space? Essentially, the US Army had the same problem as the Russians in , when the law and Constitutional interpretation decreed that the National Guard could not be sent out of United States Territory, which created a dilemma for planners on how to use it as an effective reserve or nucleus for a large volunteer army. I believe this is occurring against the backdrop of moderate, but not catastrophic organizational disorder and restructuring in the Russian armed forces, which are delaying its readiness to launch a large scale offensive. The sky is filled with aircraft. A salient is a classically vulnerable position - a glaringly obvious operational focal point, because simultaneous attacks at the base of the bulge can easily cut it off and trap the forces inside. The general picture is of a chaotic and ad-hoc retreat from the city , not an orderly and pre-planned withdrawal. With the collapse of the negotiation process whether thanks to Boris Johnson or not , it became clear that the only way out of the conflict would be through the strategic defeat of one party by the other. Thats my more reasoned comment. We are taking heavy losses. The latter is a ruski pun Thats practically a cognate of morgue… They have hardly any responses, we should flood the zone.

2 thoughts on “Big serge substack

  1. In my opinion you commit an error. Let's discuss. Write to me in PM, we will communicate.

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